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system of non-nitist arithmetic. When re ective closure is applied to suitable systems of set theory, one is able to derive large cardinal axioms as theorems. It is an open question how t h e s e may b e c haracterized in terms of current notions in that subject.
1 Why new axioms? G odel's published statements over the years (from 1931 to 1972) pointing to the need for new axioms to settle both undecided number-theoretic and settheoretic propositions are rather well known. They are most easily cited by reference to the rst two v olumes of the edition of his Collected Works. 1 A number of less familiar statements of a similar character from his unpublished essays and lectures are now a vailable in the third volume of that edition. 2 Given the ready accessibility of these sources, there is no need for extensive quotation, though several representative passages are singled out below f o r special attention.
With one possible exception (to be noted in the next section), the single constant that recurs throughout these statements is that the new axioms to be considered are in all cases of a set-theoretic nature. More speci cally, t o begin with, axioms of higher types, extended into the trans nite, are said to be needed even to settle undecided arithmetical propositions. 3 The rst and most succinct statement of this is to be found in the singular footnote 48a of the 1931 incompleteness paper, in which G odel states that \...the true reason for the incompleteness inherent in all formal systems of mathematics is that the formation of ever higher types can be continued into the transnite... since] the undecidable propositions constructed here become decidable whenever appropriate higher types are added". In an unpublished lecture from that same period G odel says that analysis is higher in this sense than number theory and set theory is higher than analysis: \...there are numbertheoretic problems that cannot be solved with number-theoretic, but only with analytic or, respectively, set-theoretic methods" (G odel 1995] , p.35). A couple of years later, in his (unpublished) 1933 lecture at a meeting of the Mathematical Association of America in Cambridge, Massachusetts, G odel said that for the systems S to which his incompleteness theorems apply \...ex-actly the next higher type not contained in S is necessary to prove this arithmetical proposition... and moreover] there are arithmetic propositions which cannot be proved even by analysis but only by methods involving extremely large in nite cardinals and similar things" (G odel 1995] , p.48). This assertion of the necessity of axioms of higher type | a.k.a. axioms of in nity in higher set theory | to settle undecided arithmetic ( 0 1 ) propositions, is repeated all the way to the nal of the references cited here in footnotes 1 and 2 (namely to 1972).
It is only with his famous 1947 article on Cantor's continuum problem that G odel also pointed to the need for new set-theoretic axioms to settle speci cally set-theoretic problems, in particular that of the Continuum Hypothesis CH. Of course at that time one only knew through his own work the (relative) consistency of AC and CH with ZF, though G odel conjectured the falsity of CH and hence its independence from ZFC. Moreover, it was the question of determining the truth value of CH that was to preoccupy him almost exclusively among all set-theoretic problems | except for those which might be ancillary to its solution | for the rest of his life. And rightly so: the continuum problem | to locate 2 @0 in the scale of the alephs whose existence is forced on us by the well-ordering theorem | is the very rst challenging problem of Cantorian set theory, and settling it might be considered to bolster its conceptual coherence. In his 1947 paper, for the decision of CH by new axioms, G odel mentioned rst of all, axioms of in nity:
The simplest of these ... assert the existence of inaccessible numbers (and of numbers inaccessible in the stronger sense) > @ 0 .
The latter axiom, roughly speaking, means nothing else but that the totality of sets obtainable by exclusive use of the processes of formation of sets expressed in the other axioms forms again a set (and, therefore, a new basis for a further application of these processes). Other axioms of in nity h a ve b e e n f o r m ulated by P . Mahlo. Very little is known about this section of set theory but at any rate] 4 these axioms show clearly, not only that the axiomatic system of set theory as known today is incomplete, but also that it can be supplemented without arbitrariness by new axioms which are only the natural continuation of those set up so far. (G odel 1990] , p.182) However, G odel goes on to say, quite presciently, that \ a]s for the continuum problem, there is little hope of solving it by means of those axioms of in nity which can be set up on the basis of principles known today...", because his proof of the consistency of CH via the constructible sets model goes through without change when such statements are adjoined as new axioms (indeed there is no hope in this direction if one expects to prove CH false):
But probably in the face of this] there exist other axioms] based on hitherto unknown principles ... which a more profound understanding of the concepts underlying logic and mathematics would enable us to recognize as implied by these concepts. (ibid.) Possible candidates for these were forthcoming through the work of Scott 1961] in which i t w as shown that the existence of measurable cardinals (MC) implies the negation of the axiom of constructibility, and the later work of Hanf 1964] and of Keisler and Tarski 1964] which showed that measurable cardinals and even weakly compact cardinals must be very much larger than anything obtained by closure conditions on cardinals of the sort leading to hierarchies of inaccessibles. But as we n o w know through the extensive s u b s equent w ork on large cardinals as well as other strong set-theoretic principles such as forms of determinacy, none of those considered at all plausible to date settles CH one way or the other (cf. Martin 1976] , Kanamori 1994] ). G odel himself o ered only one candidate besides these, in his unpublished 1970 notes containing his \square axioms" concerning so-called scales of functions on the @ n 's. The rst of these notes (*1970a in G odel 1995] ) purports to prove that the cardinality of the continuum is @ 2 while the second (*1970b, op.cit.) purports to prove t h a t i t i s @ 1 . H o wever, there are essential gaps in both proofs and in any case the axioms considered are far from evident (cf. the introductory note by R.M. Solovay t o * 1970a,b,c in G odel 1995] , pp. 405-420). G odel's nal fall-back position in his 1947 article is to look for axioms which are \so abundant in their veri able consequences...that quite irrespective of their intrinsic necessity t h e y w ould have to be assumed in the same sense as any w ell-established physical theory" (G odel 1990] , p.183). It would take us too far a eld to look into the question whether there are any plausible candidates for these. Moreover, there is no space here to consider the arguments given by others in pursuit of the program for new axioms especially worthy of attention are Maddy 1988 Maddy , 1988a My concern in the rest of this paper is to concentrate on the consideration of axioms which are supposed to be \exactly as evident" as those already accepted. On the face of it this excludes, among others, axioms for \very large" cardinals (compact, measurable, etc.), axioms of determinacy, axioms of randomness, and axioms whose only grounds for accepting them lies in their \fruitfulness" or in their simply having properties analogous to those of @ 0 . E v en with this restriction, as we shall see, there is much r o o m f o r reconsideration of G odel's program.
2 Where should one look for new axioms?
While the passage to higher types in successive stages, in one form or another, is su cient t o o vercome incompleteness with respect to number-theoretic propositions because of the increase in consistency strength at each s u c h stage, it by no means follows that this is the only way of adding new axioms in a principled way for that purpose. Indeed, here a quotation from G odel's remarks in 1946 before the Princeton Bicentennial Conference is very apropos:
Let us consider, e.g., the concept of demonstrability. I t i s w ell known that, in whichever way y ou make it precise by m e a n s of a formalism, the contemplation of this very formalism gives rise to new axioms which are exactly as evident and justi ed as those with which y ou started, and this process of extension can be iterated into the trans nite. So there cannot exist any formalism which w ould embrace all these steps but this does not exclude that all these steps (or at least all of them which g i v e something new for the domain of propositions in which y ou are interested) could be described and collected together in some nonconstructive w ay. ( G odel 1990] , p.151) It is this passage that I had in mind above as the one possible exception to G odel's reiterated call for new set-theoretic axioms to settle undecided number-theoretic propositions. It is true that he goes on immediately to say that \ i]n set theory, e.g., the successive extensions can most conveniently be represented by stronger and stronger axioms of in nity". But note that here he is referring to set theory as an example of a formalism to which the general idea of expansion by \new axioms exactly as evident and justi ed as those with which y ou started" may be applied as a special case. That idea, in the case of formal systems S in the language of arithmetic comes down instead to one form or another of (proof-theoretic) re ection principle, that is a formal scheme to the e ect that whatever is provable in S is correct. In its weakest form (assuming the syntax of S e ectively and explicitly given), this is the collection of statements (Rfn S ) P r o v S (# (A) )! A for A a closed formula in the language of S, called the local re ection principle. 5 This is readily generalized to arbitrary formulas A uniformly in the free variables of A as parameters, in which case it is called the uniform re ection principle RFN S . The axioms Rfn S , and more generally, R F N S may indeed be considered \exactly as evident and justi ed" as those with which one started.
Moreover, as shown by T uring 1939], extension by s u c h axioms may be effectively iterated into the trans nite, in the sense that one can associate with each constructive ordinal notation a 2 O a formal system S a such t h a t t h e step from any o n e s u c h system to its successor is described by adjunction of the re ection principle in question, and where all previous adjunctions are simply accumulated at limits by the formation of their union. These kinds of systematic extensions of a given formal system were called ordinal logics by T uring when I took them up later in 1962, I rechristened them (transnite) recursive progressions of axiomatic theories (cf. Feferman 1962 Feferman , 1988 ). While Turing obtained a completeness result for 0 1 statements via the transnite iteration in this sense of the local re ection principle, and I obtained one for all true arithmetic statements via the iteration of the uniform reection principle, both completeness results were problematic because they depended crucially on the judicious choice of notations in O, the selection of which w as no more \evident and justi ed" in advance than the statements to be proved.
What was missing in this rst attempt to spell out the general idea expressed by G odel in the above quotation was an explanation of which ordinals | in the constructive sense | ought to be accepted in the iteration procedure. The rst modi cation made to that end (Kreisel 1958 ], Feferman 1964 ) was to restrict to autonomous progressions of theories, where one advances to a notation a 2 O only if it has been proved in a system S b , for some b which precedes a, that the ordering specifying a is indeed a well-ordering. It was with this kind of procedure in mind that Kreisel called in his paper 1970] for the study of all principles of proof and ordinals which are implicit in given concepts. H o wever, one may question whether it is appropriate at all to speak of the concept of ordinal, in whatever way restricted, as being implicit in the concepts of, say, arithmetic. I thus began to pursue a modi cation of that program in Feferman 1979] , where I proposed a characterization of that part of mathematical thought which is implicit in our conception of the natural numbers, without any prima-facie use of the notions of ordinal or well-ordering. This turned out to yield a system proof-theoretically equivalent t o t h a t p r o p o s e d a s a c haracterization of predicativity in Feferman 1964] and Sch utte 1965] . Then in my paper 1991], I proposed more generally, a notion of re ective closure of arbitrary schematically axiomatized theories, which g a ve the same result (proof-theoretically) as the preceding when applied to Peano Arithmetic as initial system. That made use of a partial self-applicative notion of truth, treated axiomatically. The purpose of the present article is to report a new general notion of re ective closure of a quite di erent form, which I believe is more convincing as an explanation of everything that one ought to accept if one has accepted given concepts and principles. In order not to confuse it with the earlier proposal, I shall call this notion that of the unfolding of any given schematically formalized system. This will be illustrated here in the case of non-nitist arithmetic as well as the case of set theory. Exact characterizations in more familiar terms have been obtained for the case of non-nitist arithmetic in collaboration with Thomas Strahm these will be described in Section 4 below. However, there is no space here to give a n y proofs.
3 How is the unfolding of a system de ned?
As we shall see, it is of the essence of the notion of unfolding that we a r e dealing with schematically presented formal systems. In the usual conception, formal schemata for axioms and rules of inference employ free p r edicate variables P Q : : :of various numbers of arguments n 0. An appropriate substitution for P (x 1 : : : x n ) i n s u c h a s c heme is a formula A(x 1 : : : x n : : : ) which m a y h a ve additional free variables. (Thus if P is 0-ary, a n y f o r m ula may be substituted for it.) Familiar examples of axiom schemata in the propositional and predicate calculi are :P ! (P ! Q) and (8x)P (x) ! P (t) :
Further, in non-nitist arithmetic, we h a ve t h e Induction Axiom Scheme (IA)
while in set theory we h a ve t h e Separation and Replacement Schemes (Sep) (9b)(8x) x 2 b $ x 2 a^P(x) ] and (Repl) (8x 2 a)(9!y)P (x y) ! (9b)(8y) y 2 b $ (9x 2 a)P(x y) ]:
Familiar examples of schematic rules of inference are, rst of all, in the propositional and predicate calculi, P P ! Q ) Q and P ! Q(x) ] ) P ! (8x)Q(x) ] (for x not free in P) while the scheme for the Induction Rule in nitist arithmetic is given by (IR)
It is less usual to think of schemata for axioms and rules given by free function variables f g : : :But actually, it is more natural to formulate the Replacement Axiom Scheme in functional form as follows:
Note that here, and for added compelling reasons below, our function variables are treated as ranging over partial functions.
The informal philosophy behind the use of schemata here is their openendedness. That is, they are not conceived of as applying to a speci c language whose stock of basic symbols is xed in advance, but rather as applicable to any language which one comes to recognize as embodying meaningful basic notions. Put in other terms, implicit in the acceptance of given schemata is the acceptance of any meaningful substitution instances. B u t which these instances are need not be determined in advance. Thus, for example, if one accepts the axioms and rules of inference of the classical propositional calculus given in schematic form, one will accept all substitution instances of these schemata in any language which one comes to employ. The same holds for the schemata of the sort given above for arithmetic and set theory. In this spirit, we do not conceive of the function, resp. predicate variables as having a xed intended range and it is for this reason that they are treated as free variables. Of course, if one takes it to be meaningful to talk about the totality of partial functions, resp. predicates, of a given domain of objects, then it would be reasonable to bind them too by q u a n ti cation. In the examples of unfolding given here, it is only in set theory that the issue of whether and to what extent to allow quanti cation over function variables is unsettled. Now our question is this: given a schematic system S, which operations and predicates | and which principles concerning them | ought to be a ccepted if one has accepted S? The answer for operations is straightforward: any operation from and to individuals is accepted in the unfolding of S which is determined (in successive steps) explicitly or implicitly from the basic operations of S. Moreover, the principles which are added concerning these operations are just those which are derived from the way they are introduced. Ordinarily, w e w ould con ne ourselves to the total operations obtained in this way, i.e. those which h a ve been proved to be de ned for all values of their arguments, but it should not be excluded that their introduction might depend in an essential way on prior partial operations, e.g. those introduced by recursive de nitions of a general form. We reformulate the question concerning predicates in operational terms as well, i.e.: which operations on and to predicates | and which principles concerning them | ought to be a c cepted if one has accepted S? For this, it is necessary to tell at the outset which logical operations on predicates are taken for granted i n S. For example, in the case of non-nitist classical arithmetic these would be (say) the operations : ^and 8, while in the case of nitist arithmetic, we w ould use just : and^. It proves simplest to treat predicates as propositional functions thus : and^are operations on propositions, while 8 is an operation on functions from individuals to propositions. Now w e c a n add to the operations from individuals to individuals in the unfolding of S also all those operations from individuals and/or propositions to propositions which are determined explicitly or implicitly (in successive steps) from the basic logical operations of S. Once more, the principles concerning these operations which are included in the expansive closure of S are just those which are derived from the way they are introduced. Finally, we include in the expansive closure o f S all the predicates which are generated f r om the basic predicates of S by these operations the principles which are taken concerning them are just those that fall out from the principles for the operations just indicated.
This notion of unfolding of a system is spelled out in completely precise terms in the next section for the case of non-nitist arithmetic. But the following two p o i n ts ought to be noted concerning the general conception described here. First of all, one should not think of the unfolding of a system S as delimiting the range of applicability o f t h e s c hemata embodied in S. For example, the principle of induction is applicable in every context in which the basic structure of the natural numbers is recognized to be present, even if that context involves concepts and principles not implicit in our basic system for that structure. In particular, it is applicable to impredicative reasoning with sets, even though (as will be shown in the next section) the unfolding closure of arithmetic is limited to predicative reasoning. Secondly, w e m a y expect the language and theorems of the unfolding of (an e ectively given system) S to be e ectively enumerable, but we should not expect to be able to decide which operations introduced by implicit (e.g. recursive x e d -p o i n t) de nitions are well de ned for all arguments, even though it may b e j u s t those with which w e w i s h t o b e c o n c e r n e d i n t h e e n d . T h i s e c hoes G odel's picture of the process of obtaining new axioms which are \just as evident and justi ed" as those with which w e started (quoted in Section 2 above), for which w e cannot say in advance exactly what those will be, though we can describe fully the means by which they are to be obtained.
for Sc(t) in the following. The axioms of NFA a r e : Ax 1.
x 0 6 = 0 Ax 2.
Ax 3 is of course our scheme (IA) of induction. Before de ning the full unfolding (NFA) of this system, it is helpful to explain a subsystem 0 (NFA) which might be called the operational unfolding of NFA, i.e. where we d o not consider which predicates are to be obtained. Basically, the idea is to introduce new operations via a form of generalized recursion theory (g.r.t.) considered axiomatically. The speci c g.r.t. referred to is that developed in Moschovakis 1989] and in a di erent-appearing but equivalent form in Feferman 1991a] and 1996] both feature explicit de nition (ED) and least xed p oint recursion (LFP) and are applicable to arbitrary structures with given functions or functionals of type level 2 o ver a given basic domain (or domains). The basic structure to consider in the case of arithmetic is h Sc Pd 0i, where is the set of natural numbers. To treat this axiomatically, we simply have to enlarge our language to include the terms for the (in general) partial functions and functionals generated by closure under the schemata for this g.r.t., and add their de ning equations as axioms. So we have terms of three types to consider: individual terms, partial function terms and partial functional terms. T h e t ypes of these are described as follows, where, to allow for later extension to the case of (NFA), we posit a set T y p 0 of types of level 0 here we will only need it to contain the type of individuals, but below it will be expanded to include the type of propositions: Typ 1. 2 T y p 0 , where is the type of individuals. In the following range over T y p 0 and , r e s p . range over types of nite sequences of individuals, resp. of objects of T y p 0 . Typ 2. range over the types of partial functions of the form f ! , a n d ranges over the types of nite sequences of such.
Typ 3. ( f ! ) is used as types of partial functionals.
Note that objects of partial function type take only individuals as arguments this is to insure that propositional functions, to be considered below, are just such functions. On the other hand, we m a y h a ve partial functionals of type described under Ty p 3 i n w h i c h the sequence is empty, and these reduce to partial functions of any objects of basic type in T y p 0 .
The terms r s t u : : :of the various types under Ty p 1 { T yp 3 are generated as follows, where we u s e r : to indicate that the term r is of type . Fm 1. The atomic formulas are s = t s # and P(s) for s t : . Fm 2. If A B are formulas then so also are :A A^B, a n d 8xA. As indicated above, formulas A _ B A ! B, and 9xA are de ned as usual in classical logic. We w r i t e s ' t for s # _ t #! s = t]. Below w e write t f x], resp. A f x] for a term, resp. formula, with designated sequences of free variables f x it is not excluded that t, resp. A may c o n tain other free variables when using this notation. Since we are dealing with possibly unde ned (individual) terms t, the underlying system of logic to be used is the logic of partial terms (LPT) introduced by Beeson 1985] , pp. 97-99, where t # is read as: t is de ned. Brie y, the changes to be made from usual predicate logic are, rst, that the axiom for 8-instantiation is modi ed to 8xA(x)^t #! A(t) : In addition, it is assumed that 8x(x #), i.e. only compound terms may f a i l t o be de ned (or put otherwise, non-existent individuals are not countenanced in LPT). It is further assumed that if a compound term is de ned then all its subterms are de ned (\strictness" axioms). Finally, one assumes that if s = t holds then both s t are de ned and if P(s) holds then s is de ned. Note that (s #) $ 9 x(s = x), so de nedness need not be taken as a basic symbol.
The axioms of 0 (NFA) follow the obvious intended meaning of the new compound terms introduced by the clauses Tm 5-8:
Ax 5. ( f x:s f x])( t u) ' s t u] : Ax 6. For ' = L F P ( f x:t f x]) we h a ve:
Finally, the predicate substitution rule for 0 (NFA) is: (Subst)
A P] ) A B=P] where in the conclusion of this rule, B is any f o r m ula with a designated free variable x B x], and we substitute B t] for each occurrence of P (t) i n A. This completes the description of 0 (NFA).
In the following we shall write fif y = 0 then s f x] else t f x] g for (Cond( f x:s f x:t y 0) )( f x) in order to meet the strictness axioms of LPT this piece of notation has the property that the compound term is de ned when y = 0 i f s is de ned, even if t is not de ned, while it is de ned when y 6 = 0 a n d t is de ned if s is not de ned. We shall use capital letters F for closed terms of function type such t h a t NFA proves 8 x(F ( x)#), i.e. for which F is proved to be total. Suppose given such terms G H of arguments ( x) and ( x y z), resp. Then we can obtain an F with F ( x 0) = G( x) F( x y 0 ) = H( x y F ( x y ) ) provable in 0 (NFA). This is done by taking ' = L F P f x y : fif y = 0 then G( x) else H( x Pd(y) f ( x P d(y) ) g ] : It is then proved by induction on y that '(y) # t h i s i s b y an application of the substitution rule to the schematic induction axiom IA (Ax 3) together with part (i) of the LFP axiom (Ax 6). Then we can take F to be the term '. It follows that 0 (NFA) serves to de ne all primitive recursive functions, and so by IA and the substitution rule, we see that 0 (NFA) contains the system of Peano Arithmetic PA in its usual rst order (non-schematic) form. I believe this argument formalizes the informal argument (usually not even consciously expressed) which leads us to accept PA starting with the bare-bones system NFA. The intended meaning of these symbols is elucidated by Ax 7-11 below.
The formulas A B C : : :of (NFA) are generated as follows, where T (x) is an additional predicate which expresses that x is a true proposition: Because propositional terms in general implicitly depend on the predicate parameter P , w e m ust restrict the rule A P ] ) A B=P] t o f o r m ulas A which do not contain any such terms. We w r i t e P r e d n (t) for (8 x)(t( x) #) when t : f ! and is of length n. N o w the usual way o f t h i n k i n g o f a sequence of n-ary predicates is as a function f of type f !( f ! ) s u c h that for each x, f(x) # and P r e d n (f(x) ) .H o wever, we do not have these types in our setup (although that is easily modi ed to include them). Instead, a sequence of n-ary predicates is treated as being represented by a g of type f ! such that for each x y we h a ve g(x y) #, in other words so that for each x Pred n ( y g(x y) ) .S u c h g can, at the same time, be considered as an (n + 1)-ary predicate and in that guise g is simply the join of the sequence it represents: J(g) = g. Now the main result about proof-theoretic strength of (NFA) is the following theorem, obtained in collaboration with Thomas Strahm.
Theorem 2 (NFA) is proof-theoretically equivalent to the system of rami ed analysis up to but not including ; 0 , and conservatively extends that system.
The system of rami ed analysis up to and including level is denoted RA , and the union of these for < is denoted RA < . F or = ! this is proof-theoretically equivalent to the iteration of ( 0 1 ;CA) through all levels < . Using Kreisel's proposed characterization of predicative analysis in terms of the autonomous progression of rami ed systems, the least impredicative ordinal was determined to be ; 0 in Feferman 1964 ] and, independently, Sch utte 1965 . Theorem 2 thus re-characterizes predicativity as what ought to be a c cepted c oncerning operations and predicates if one has accepted t h e basic notions and principles of NFA, including the logical operations : ^and 8 applied to variables for the natural numbers. The proof of this theorem is rather involved and full details will be presented elsewhere the following merely gives an indication of how t o e m bed RA <;o in (NFA), by means of the methods of Feferman 1979] , sec.3.3. Basically, one shows for each initial segment of the standard primitive recursive w ell-ordering of order type ; 0 how to establish in (NFA) the principle of trans nite induction up to applied to arbitrary formulas A, i n s y m bols, TI( A ). For this it su ces to prove TI( P ) and then apply the substitution rule. Now with the full scheme at hand, one can de ne the jump ( 0 1 ) hierarchy relative t o P along by LFP recursion and prove that it de nes a predicate by induction on this ordering. Note that the de nition of this hierarchy m a k es use of arithmetical steps at successor stages, guaranteed by the axioms Ax 7-11, and of join at limit stages, guaranteed by t h e u s e o f t h e J operator as explained above. As is shown in the reference loc.cit., by use of this hierarchy relative to P up to , one can prove T I ( P ) for = ( ) (0) in the Veblen hierarchy of critical functions. De ne 0 = 0 n+1 = ( n) (0) then ; 0 = lim n n , s o by this means we c a n e m bed RA in (NFA) for each < ; 0 . The proof that (NFA) is no stronger than RA <;0 requires some interesting new arguments from in nitary proof theory. H o wever, it is worth noting that in this proof, partial functions of type f ! are still interpreted as partial recursive functions. Indeed the same holds for functions of type f ! when propositions are treated intensionally. Remarks 1. Implicit de nability of functions. Another way o f i n troducing partial functions given by implicit de ning conditions is if we associate with each partial f : f ! a g : f ! with
Adding (ID) as an axiom to 0 (NFA) and (NFA) does not a ect Theorems 1 and 2. It is plausible to include (ID) in the unfolding process applied to any system with a distinguished constant 0 .
2. Predicate types in place of the type of propositions. We can treat predicates directly, instead of in terms of propositional functions, by i ntroducing a basic type of n-ary predicates n for each n 1. Then the atomic formulas to be used in the process for this symbolism are of the form s = t for s t : n s# for s : n and (t 1 : : : t n ) 2 s for s : n and t j : (j = 1 : : : n ). The axioms provide for suitable operations corresponding to atomic predicates and for the e ect of Ne g and Conj on each n and Unon n+1 to n for each n. In addition, we include the Join operator J for each n, w h i c h when applied to a sequence of n-ary predicates, i.e. a total f : ! n , produces the join predicate J(f) : n+1 . In the language, so modi ed, the rule of substitution A P] ) A B=P] is restricted to A which do not contain terms of predicate type. Then Theorem 2 holds as before. An advantage of the predicate type over the propositional type approach i s t h a t w e can separate out the role of the Join operator from that of the logical operations while, as we s a w, J is forced on us in the propositional type approach. Strahm has shown that if J is omitted, then the resulting system ; (NFA) is proof-theoretically equivalent t o RA <! .
3. Quantifying function variables. It was argued in Section 3 that for the general notion of unfolding, (partial) function variables in their schematic role ought not to be quanti ed. However, when we come to set theory and examine informal arguments that lead us to accept its basic principles and their immediate extensions, it is plausible to allow some degree or other of function quanti cation. Proof-theoretical strength there is sensitive to the decision as to whether to allow s u c h quanti cation, and, if so, to what extent, as will be seen in the next section. Interestingly, it happens that in the case of NFA, even if we a l l o w full function quanti cation in the language of 0 (NFA), resp. (NFA), with suitable restrictions on the hypothesis A P] of the substitution rule as above, we do not alter proof-theoretic strength, i.e. Theorems 1 a n d 2 c o n tinue to hold as stated.
4. The unfolding of nitist arithmetic. Clearly the starting point f o r the study of this notion would be a quanti er-free system FA based on Axs 1 and 2 and, in place of Ax 3, the induction rule
Beyond this, there are various notions of unfolding to be considered, related to various informal and formal explanations of nitism in the literature, due especially to Hilbert, Kreisel and Tait. Research o n t h e s e notions is in progress.
The unfolding of set theory
This section is largely programmatic and, given the limitations of space, necessarily sketchy. On the face of it, set theory o ers a prime candidate for the study of what is implicit in given notions and principles by means of the unfolding procedure, both for ZF as a schematic theory and for G odel's program for new axioms. We begin with the former.
In the spirit of the functional formulation of the 0 and procedures, we take the basic language of set theory to have individual variables a b c x y z : : : variables f g h : : : for partial functions, the constants 0 and !, the operation symbols f g S } , a n d E (the characteristic function of the 2 relation) and the relation symbols = and 2. In addition we h a ve functionals S R and A whose meaning will be explained in a moment. The axioms of the system ST are, besides Extensionality, the expected ones for 0 ! f g S } , a n d E, and the following four function and predicate schemata: The point of doing it by the above function schemata instead is that we c a n treat a wide variety of set theories uniformly, with the only changes being the deletion or addition (with appropriate axioms) of various individual, function and functional constants. For example, if we o m i t ! }, a n d A, w e obtain a functional schematic form AST of Admissible Set Theory. T o be more precise KP (taken with 0 -Replacement instead of 0 -Collection) is contained in 0 (AST), and the latter is interpretable in the constructible sets of the former by taking the function variables to range over the (L) 1 partial functions. It would be of interest to determine the strength of (AST).
Quite a few useful general principles and functional constructions can be derived in 0 (AST) and (AST), which then carry over to (the respective unfolding) of any set theory S extending AST. In particular, we can derive principles of induction for various classes C with an ordering < C in the form: I(< C ) 8x 2 C 8y(y < C x ! P (y) )! P (x) ] ! 8 x 2 C P (x) ] :
Here < C might b e m uch \longer" than the ordinals, for which w e h a ve I(<) by the axiom I(2). Taking as a symbol for the class of ordinals, we c a n de ne, for example, the lexicographic ordering < 2 on pairs of ordinals by h i < 2 h i $ < _ = ^ < , and prove I(< 2 ) i n 0 (AST).
From this and the LFP construction we can derive a principle of recursion for hierarchies of functions : f ( ) b y means of any g i v en functional G which determines each f in terms of hf i < . More generally, I expect that we can establish I(< ) i n 0 (AST) for each < " +1 and similarly for each < ; +1 in (AST), where the ordering up to ; +1 is de ned in AST on a suitable class of \notations" as in Feferman 1968] . We w ould then obtain related principles of recursion and construction of hierarchies as for < 2 above. Note that the form of this ordering is independent o f w h i c h s e t theory S we are in, but the interpretation in a standard model of S depends on what ordinal turns out to be. What stronger S serve t o d o i s s u p p l y a greater variety of functionals G for generating hierarchies associated with < when I(< ) i s p r o vable. Suppose S is an extension of our initial system ST to which w e h a ve added AC and the existence of arbitrarily large inaccessible cardinals. Then the preceding allows us to actually \name" speci c large inaccessibles in the unfolding systems of S. In that sense, it already gives us some large cardinal axioms. But if we are to generate, e.g., hierarchies of Mahlo cardinals, we need to add to ST a new scheme which s a ys in e ect that whatever holds in the universe of sets already holds in arbitrarily large transitive sets, o r w h a t one would call a scheme of Downwards Re ection. T h i s t a k es the following form:
If this scheme is denoted A P] a n d B is a statement which i n volves both quanti ed individual variables and (possibly) quanti ed function variables, when forming B (b) is to obtain stronger large cardinal statements, e.g. the existence of weakly compact cardinals, it is necessary to make substitutions by more complicated formulas. For, as shown in the work of Hanf and Scott 1961 ], a cardinal is weakly compact i it is 1 1 indescribable. The latter says that (D-Ref) holds in V for all 1 1 statements, and saying that is 1 2 . In general, we obtain the existence of arbitrarily large 1 n indescribables by suitably more complicated instances of (D-Ref) . And that is all one can expect to follow from (DRef) in our languages using only function variables of type level 1 over the universe. And passing to higher types | however one were to argue for that | for substitution instances in (D-Ref) , at most allows one to obtain the existence of m n indescribables for all m n. But one certainly cannot obtain in this way the existence of measurable cardinals nor even some of its familiar consequences such as the existence of 0 # (or even of some still weaker consequences from in nitary combinatorics, such as explained in Kanamori 1994] p.109).
However, as I see it, there is already a at di erence between the reasoning which leads us to the hierarchies of Mahlo cardinals, and that which l e a d s , to begin with, to weakly compact cardinals. Here a quotation from Tarski is apropos:
... the belief in the existence of inaccessible cardinals > ! (and even of arbitrarily large cardinals of this kind) seems to be a natural consequence of basic intuitions underlying the \na ve" set theory and referring to what can be called \Cantor's absolute". On the contrary, w e see at this moment no cogent i n tuitive reasons which could induce us to believe in the existence of cardinals > ! that are not strongly incompact, or which a t l e a s t w ould make i t very plausible that the hypothesis stating the existence of such cardinals is consistent with familiar axiom systems of set theory. As was pointed out at the end of Section 1, we do not know o f a n y \constructively characterized" cardinal > ! of which w e cannot prove that it is strongly incompact and for which therefore the problems discussed remain open. (Tarski 1962] , p.134). G odel, commenting on this in a footnote (20) added in 1965 to his 1940 monograph (after referring to the work of Levy 1960] and Bernays 1961] leading to \all of Mahlo's axioms") said:
Propositions which, if true, are extremely strong axioms of innity o f a n e n tirely new kind have been formulated and investigated as to their consequences and mutual implications in Tarski 1962], Keisler and Tarski 1964] and the papers cited there. In contradistinction to Mahlo's axioms the truth (or consistency) of these axioms does not immediately follow from \the basic intuitions underlying abstract sic] set theory" (Tarski 1962 ], p. 134), nor can it, as of now, be derived from them. However, the new axioms are supported by rather strong arguments from analogy ... (G odel 1990] p. 97, italics mine).
What makes the separation of Mahlo from weakly compact cardinals reasonable is that when we substitute for P in (D-Ref) a 1 1 statement B , w e m a y read B as asserting a closure c ondition in the ordinary sense on V under given function(al)s. But this reading is not plausibly extended to statements of higher function-quanti er complexity. F rom what G odel says in the preceding quotation, it seems he would agree with this argument for demarcation. 7 My personal attitude concerning the question of \actual" existence of various kinds of large cardinals, whether smaller or larger, is that it is all pie in the sky. T h i s m a y m a k e one wonder why I h a ve e v en bothered with the present section. Well, the starting point w as to see what one can say about which large cardinal statements are implicit in the basic notions and principles of set theory, if one accepts them, as G odel and many other logicians certainly do, and to try to apply the unfolding procedure to begin to say something precise about that. 8 While that hypothetical acceptance does not apply to me, there are other potential values of great interest to me, which I hope will result from further pursuit of the present framework. The analogues to various large cardinal statements in admissible set theory are well-known. The work earlier in this section with AST suggests to me that there should be a way of stating these as part of a common generalization via the unfolding of S+(D-Ref) for S AST, and not merely an analogue. Still further, there has been a surprising use of recursive ordinal notation systems employing \names" for very large cardinals in current proof-theoretic ordinal analyses of formal systems (cf. e.g. Rathjen 1995] ). What I would really hope comes out of this is a generalization which encompasses these as well, and helps explain how it is that they come to be employed at all for these 7 Tait 1990], p.76, ftn. 6, is puzzled by t h i s v i e w o f G odel's. But he says there that the existence of weakly compact cardinals follows from 1 1 re ection, which is mistaken, as we have seen.
8 And if one is among the set theorists who believe there are reasons for accepting much larger cardinals than follow from (ST), it should be of interest to make explicit what are the basic notions and principles that lead one to such conclusions, rather than depend on arguments from analogy or fruitfulness. In this respect, a suggestion of G odel in his 1946 Princeton remarks is most provocative:\It is certainly impossible to give a combinational and decidable characterization of what an axiom of in nity is but there might exist, e.g., a c haracterization of the following sort: An axiom of in nity is a proposition which h a s a certain (decidable) formal structure and which in addition is true." (G odel 1990], p. 151) purposes.
